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INTRODUCTION
With 739 condemned inmates currently on death row,1 California
houses the largest death-row population in the Western Hemisphere.2
Facing delays of nearly twice that of the national average, the time be-
tween a death sentence and execution is longer in California than in any
other death penalty state.3 As of January 2019, the states with the next
two largest death-row populations after California are Florida, with 353
capital prisoners; and Texas, with 232 capital prisoners.4 In Florida, the
average time a capital defendant spends on death row before execution is
14 years; and in Texas, the average time on death row before execution is
10 years.5 Although the delays in Florida and Texas appear significant,
they pale in comparison to the death-row delays in California, where the
1 Condemned Inmate List, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB. DIV. OF ADULT OPERATIONS http:/
/www.cdcr.ca.gov/Capital_Punishment/docs/CondemnedInmateListSecure.pdf?pdf=Condemned-In
mates (last visited Feb. 9, 2019).
2 California, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/california-1#sent (last
visited Sept. 3, 2018) (citing Chris Nichols, Truth be told: California has ‘Largest Death Row in
Western Hemisphere,’ S. CAL. PUB. RADIO (Aug. 12, 2016), http://www.scpr.org/news/2016/08/12/
63532/truth-be-told-california-has-largest-death-row-in).
3 California’s average lapsed time from judgment of death to execution is 20-25 years; the
national average is 11-14 years. See CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUST., FINAL REPORT
123-25 n.32 (N. Cal. Innocence Project Publ’n 2008), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=1000&context=ncippubs.
4 Death-Row Prisoners by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/
death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year (last visited Jan. 18, 2019).
5 CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUST., supra note 3, at 124-25 & n.32.
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time from a judgment of death to execution often takes 20 to 25 years.6
The length of delay between sentence and disposition of appellate review
gets longer each year as California’s death-row population continues to
grow.7
California’s death-penalty system has placed the state in a capital
crisis.8 Without the proper funding, California has been unable to litigate
the increasingly unmanageable backlog of pending capital appeals and
habeas corpus petitions.9 Legitimate efforts to remedy the state’s capital
crisis through statutory reform must account for the system’s underlying
problems, or they will otherwise risk causing additional delays that will
further burden the system.
Proposition 66, a recently passed California initiative, is a prime ex-
ample of a death-penalty reform that will only contribute to the ineffi-
ciency of California’s broken capital system.10 Designed to speed up the
capital appellate review process, Proposition 66 changed procedures gov-
erning state court challenges to death sentences, including setting a five-
year time limit for capital appellate review.11 The initiative, however,
was silent as to the means of achieving this five-year time frame.12 With-
out providing judicial guidance on how a significantly shorter time frame
could be effectuated and funded, Proposition 66 fails to yield any realis-
tic chance at reform.13
Briggs v. Brown challenged the constitutionality of Proposition 66.14
The court addressed whether Proposition 66’s five-year time limit for
capital appellate review violated the separation of powers doctrine by
6 Id. at 123 (“The average lapse of time between pronouncement of death and execution in
California is 17.2 years, but using an ‘average’ number may be misleading since only thirteen have
been executed.”). See also Arthur L. Alarcón, Remedies for California’s Death Row Deadlock, 80 S.
CAL. L. REV. 697, 707-08 (2007) (In 2007, of the 662 capital inmates on death row, 30 people had
been on California’s death row for more than 25 years; 119 had been on death row for more than 20
years; and 240 had been on death row for more than 15 years.).
7 CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUST., supra note 3, at 125.
8 The term “capital crisis” is used throughout this Comment in reference to challenges faced
by the state in the processing of death-penalty cases. See, e.g., Arthur L. Alarcón & Paula M. Mitch-
ell, Executing the Will of the Voters?: A Roadmap to Mend or End the California Legislature’s
Multi-Billion-Dollar Death Penalty Debacle, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 41, 186 (2011)
(“crisis confronting California in its processing of capital litigation”).
9 See id. at 46-47.
10 See CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, Analysis by the Legislative Analyst, in OFFICIAL VOTER INFO.
GUIDE 104, 104-07 (2016), https://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2018/general/pdf/complete-vig.pdf [hereinafter
Voter Guide].
11 Id. at 106.
12 See Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th 808, 863, 871 (Liu, J., concurring) (2017).
13 See id. (“[R]ealistic reforms must emanate from a clear understanding of the way the post-
conviction death penalty process works in California. . . . [T]he five-year time limit is not grounded
in the realities of California’s death penalty process or in the reasonable possibilities for reform.”).
14 Id. at 822 (majority opinion).
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materially impairing the court’s core function to hear and decide cases.15
Solely to preserve the initiative’s constitutionality and avoid a conceded
separation of powers violation, the California Supreme Court improperly
interpreted the measure in a manner that directly conflicts with the vot-
ers’ intent and the initiative’s primary purpose.16
Despite the provision’s mandatory language and purpose, the court
ruled that Proposition 66’s five-year time limit for capital appellate re-
view was merely “directive” and not mandatory.17 A directive interpreta-
tion of a judicial time limit provision allows for a court’s ultimate
authority in deciding the matter and does not place an actual or strict
time requirement on the courts as would a mandatory interpretation.18 A
directive interpretation is appropriate where it is (1) reasonable, as evi-
denced by the provision’s language and statutory intent,19 and in the con-
text of judicial time limits, (2) necessary to prevent an unconstitutional
encroachment on the judiciary’s power.20 The court upheld the five-year
time limit under a directive interpretation by supplying a saving con-
struction that “saved” the provision from unconstitutionally violating the
separation of powers doctrine.21 A “saving construction” is an exercise
of judicial statutory construction whereby a court may interpret a law in a
manner that avoids unconstitutionality: “If the terms of a statute are by
fair and reasonable interpretation capable of a meaning consistent with
the requirements of the Constitution, the statute will be given that mean-
ing, rather than another in conflict with the Constitution.”22
By upholding Proposition 66 under a directive interpretation, the
court inadvertently promoted the drafting of unworkable, unconstitu-
tional legislation and the application of inconsistent, arbitrary capital ap-
pellate review. Once the Briggs decision was issued, Proposition 66 went
into effect, setting new procedures and time limits for capital appellate
review.23 This Comment focuses on the court’s analysis of the constitu-
tionality of Penal Code section 190.6(d), which sets a five-year limit on
the completion of the appellate and initial habeas corpus review
15 Id. at 845; see CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.
16 See Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 857.
17 Id. at 857, 860.
18 Id. at 870 (Liu, J., concurring).
19 Smith v. Trapp, 249 Cal. App. 2d 929, 938 (1967).
20 See, e.g., Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 850-55; People v. Engram, 50 Cal. 4th 1131, 1151 (2010);
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 32 Cal. 3d 180, 186-87 (1982).
21 See Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 858 (holding that it is the practice of California courts to construe
statutes that unduly interfere with judicial functions “so as to maintain the court’s discretionary
control” rather than strike them down).
22 Metromedia, 32 Cal. 3d at 186 (quoting County of Los Angeles v. Legg, 5 Cal. 2d 349, 353
(1936)).
23 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 862.
4
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol49/iss2/7
2019] California’s Capital Crisis Continues 173
processes where a judgment of death has been imposed.24 This Comment
asserts that courts have a duty to strike down a voter-initiated time limit
on capital appellate review when the will of the voters indicates an intent
for the time limit to be mandatory—in violation of the separation of
powers doctrine—and where the measure fails to provide courts with
meaningful guidance on how to achieve the time limit. This Comment
argues that the Briggs court neglected this duty by supplying a saving
construction rather than invalidating the provision. As a result, the
court’s decision to uphold a time limit that is both fiscally and procedur-
ally unrealistic threatens to exacerbate California’s capital crisis.
Part I begins with an overview of the separation of powers doctrine.
Part II provides an overview of Proposition 66 and the California Su-
preme Court case that challenged its constitutionality. This section dis-
cusses Proposition 66’s statutory objective, the petitioners’ claim of
unconstitutionality, the respondents’ claim about the initiative’s purpose,
and the court’s separation of powers analysis. Part III discusses the state
of California’s capital crisis by (1) examining the Briggs ruling’s effect
on death-row inmates; (2) providing a brief background of California’s
death-penalty system; and (3) evaluating the Briggs ruling in connection
with the court’s duty to provide meaningful appellate review. Part IV
evaluates the court’s separation of powers analysis regarding the consti-
tutionality of the five-year time limit and addresses the problems with the
court’s directive interpretation. To illustrate the inappropriateness of the
court’s directive interpretation of the time limit, this section analyzes the
language and purpose of the initiative, the intent of the voters, and the
court’s cited case law. Finally, part V concludes that the California Su-
preme Court had a duty to invalidate an unworkable judicial time limit
that was passed by voter initiative when it is evident that the voters in-
tended for the time limit to place a mandatory requirement on the courts.
I. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE
Article III establishes the separation of powers of the executive, leg-
islative, and judicial branches of government, and requires that the three
branches remain separate and distinct from one another.25 Although each
branch maintains its own distinct governmental authority, the branches
24 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.6(d) (2018) (all references hereinafter are to the penal code unless
otherwise stated); Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 848-61.
25 CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3 (“The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and
judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except
as permitted by this Constitution.”).
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are interrelated and each branch must respect the constitutional power of
the others.26
A. THE LEGISLATURE’S POWER OF STATUTORY ENACTMENT
The judicial and executive branches generally must yield to the leg-
islature’s power to enact statutes.27 The legislature’s power of statutory
enactment includes the people’s initiative power.28 The initiative power
is the right reserved to the people “to propose statutes and amendments
to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them,” and it must be broadly
interpreted to maintain maximum power in the people.29 While the legis-
lature’s power to statutorily regulate judicial proceedings and appeals is
broad, it is not unlimited.30 Restricted by the separation of powers doc-
trine, the legislature is only permitted to prescribe reasonable rules of
judicial procedure that do not “defeat or materially impair” the courts’
core constitutional functions.31
B. THE JUDICIARY’S POWER OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A court may declare a legislative regulation invalid as a violation of
the separation of powers doctrine when “the statutory provision[ ] as a
whole, viewed from a realistic and practical perspective, operate[s] to
defeat or materially impair” the court’s exercise of its constitutional
functions.32 The courts’ functions may not be “so restricted by unreason-
able rules as to virtually nullify them.”33 However, when a regulation
may be logically and reasonably interpreted in a manner that does not
divest the court of its core functions, it is within the court’s judicial au-
thority to uphold it under the non-imposing statutory construction.34 This
judicial statutory, or “saving,” construction is appropriate only when the
language and primary objective or purpose of the provision indicates a
26 See Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 846 (quoting Superior Court v. County of Mendocino, 13 Cal. 4th
45, 52 (1996)).
27 Id. (quoting Brydonjack v. State Bar of Cal., 208 Cal. 439, 442 (1929)).
28 Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n v. McPherson, 38 Cal. 4th 1020, 1032 (2006).
29 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 827 (quoting Indep. Energy, 38 Cal. 4th at 1032); CAL. CONST. art. IV
§ 1; CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a).
30 See Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 846 (quoting Brydonjack, 208 Cal. at 442-43).
31 Id. at 846 (quoting Brydonjack, 208 Cal. at 444).
32 Marine Forests Soc’y v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 36 Cal. 4th 1, 15, 45 (2005); see also
Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 846 (quoting Le Francois v. Goel, 35 Cal. 4th 1094, 1104 (2005)).
33 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 850 (quoting In re Shafter-Wasco Irrigation Dist., 55 Cal. App. 2d
484, 487 (1942)).
34 Id. (quoting Garrison v. Rourke, 32 Cal. 2d 430, 436-37 (1948)); see People v. Engram, 50
Cal. 4th 1131, 1151 (2010); Thurmond v. Superior Court of S.F., 66 Cal. 2d 836, 839 (1967);
Lorraine v. McComb, 220 Cal. 753, 756-57 (1934).
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clear intent not to divest or impair the courts’ core functions.35 Such a
regulation is reasonably interpreted under a saving construction because,
based on the provision’s language and purpose, any other interpretation
would logically defeat the aims and purposes of the statute.36
As James Madison acutely acknowledged in the Federalist Papers,
the “interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
courts.”37 However, this duty to decipher a law’s meaning becomes more
complicated for the judiciary when the law is passed by voter initiative.38
Voter initiatives are not subject to the same process as laws proposed by
the state legislature, and consequently do not include the typical legisla-
tive hearings or committee reports that are often critical to a court’s de-
termination of a law’s purpose.39 When the constitutionality of a voter-
initiated statute is challenged, the courts are faced with the difficult task
of ascertaining the voters’ intent in passing the new law without the usual
guidance of a legislative history.40 The lack of a legislative history poses
especially serious problems when the challenged voter initiative affects
criminal justice policy or procedure.41 Because the California initiative
process prohibits the legislature from amending or repealing voter-initi-
ated legislation, it is left solely to the judiciary to strike down a voter-
initiated provision that is unconstitutional and unworkable.42
II. PROPOSITION 66 AND BRIGGS V. BROWN: REFORMS INTENDED TO
FIX A “BROKEN SYSTEM” BY SHORTENING THE TIME FOR
CAPITAL APPELLATE REVIEW
In an effort to address the significant backlog of capital cases await-
ing the California Supreme Court’s appellate review, the 2016 California
ballot included two initiatives aimed at reforming the death-penalty sys-
tem: Proposition 62 and Proposition 66.43 Proposition 62 sought to abol-
ish the state’s death penalty but failed by a slim margin, with 53.15% of
35 See Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 850 (quoting Garrison, 32 Cal. 2d at 436-37); see also Engram,
50 Cal. 4th at 1151; Metromedia, 32 Cal. 3d at 186-87.
36 See, e.g., Cal. Sch. Emps. Ass’n v. Governing Bd., 8 Cal. 4th 333, 340 (1994) (“[T]he
legislative purpose underlying [the challenged statutes] is effectuated not by a literal interpretation of
the statutory language, but rather, by construing the statutory language in order to avoid capricious
results unintended by the Legislature.”); Garrison, 32 Cal. 2d at 437 (“Words otherwise generally
mandatory or permissive will be given a different meaning when the provisions of the statute, prop-
erly construed, require it.”).
37 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (James Madison).
38 Alarcón et al., supra note 8, at 121-22.
39 Id. at 122.
40 Id.
41 See id.
42 See id. at 124, 160.
43 Quick Reference Guide, in VOTER GUIDE, supra note 10, at 8, 13, 15.
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voters voting against it.44 Proposition 66 intended to speed up the death-
penalty appeals process and passed by a narrow margin of 51.1%.45
A. PROPOSITION 66
Formally titled “The Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of
2016,” the initiative asserted that California’s death-penalty process is
ineffective due to “waste, delays, and inefficiencies.”46 Drafted predomi-
nantly by death-penalty prosecutors,47 the measure enacted a series of
statutory reforms designed to speed up the death-penalty appeals
system.48
Proposition 66 requires that the direct appeal and initial habeas
corpus proceedings are completed within five years from the imposition
of the death sentence.49 Without providing any guidance on how this
time limit is to be achieved, the initiative instructs the Judicial Council to
adopt rules and standards to ensure that the capital appellate review pro-
cess is completed within this time frame.50 Additionally, the Judicial
Council must adopt such rules within 18 months of the effective date of
the initiative, and must continuously amend the rules and standards to
further guarantee that the time limit is met.51 All pending challenges are
subject to the enactment and must be completed within five years of the
date the Judicial Council adopts the revised rules.52 If the process ex-
ceeds this five-year time limit, Proposition 66 provides that “either party
or any victim of the offense may seek relief by petition for writ of man-
date,” which the court must act on within 60 days of filing.53 Although
the initiative asserts that a court order may be sought to address a delay
44 California Proposition 62, Repeal of the Death Penalty (2016), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballot
pedia.org/California_Proposition_62,_Repeal_of_the_Death_Penalty_(2016)#cite_note-1 (last vis-
ited Mar. 10, 2018).
45 California Proposition 66, Death Penalty Procedures (2016), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballot
pedia.org/California_Proposition_66,_Death_Penalty_Procedures_(2016)#cite_note-7 (last visited
Mar. 10, 2018).
46 Text of Proposed Laws: Proposition 66, in VOTER GUIDE, supra note 10, at 212, §§ 1-2 at
212-213.
47 California Proposition 66, Death Penalty Procedures (2016), supra note 45.
48 Analysis by the Legislative Analyst, in VOTER GUIDE, supra note 10, at 104, 105.
49 Text of Proposed Laws: Proposition 66, in VOTER GUIDE, supra note 10, at 212, § 3(d) at
213.
50 Id.
51 Id. At the time this Comment was written, the Judicial Council had not yet announced any
new rules to meet the five-year time limit.
52 Id.
53 Id. § 3(e) at 213.
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that exceeds the time limit, it fails to address the exact relief the courts
may provide in such a situation.54
Opponents of the initiative cautioned the California Supreme Court
that Proposition 66 “threatens to deal a mortal blow” to California’s
courts by dictating the judicial docket and limiting the courts’ ability to
hear civil cases.55 The impracticality of the time limit is sweeping: as of
2016, there were 337 direct appeals and 263 state habeas corpus petitions
pending in the California Supreme Court.56 Placing a five-year time limit
on the court to determine all currently pending capital appeals, in addi-
tion to any new death sentences, is an unrealistic demand on the court’s
limited resources.57 Opponents asserted that the measure will overwhelm
all the state’s courts with extra work, but will affect the California Su-
preme Court the most.58 “Calculations based on the court’s typical an-
nual production indicate” that adherence to the five-year time limit could
result in the California Supreme Court spending 90% of its time on capi-
tal cases, causing “civil case rulings [to] decline from about 50 a year to
just a handful.”59
B. BRIGGS V. BROWN
1. Overview
On November 9, 2016, one day after Proposition 66 passed, Ron
Briggs and former State Attorney General John Van de Kamp filed a
petition with the California Supreme Court challenging the constitution-
ality of Proposition 66.60 In their petition, Briggs and Van de Kamp ar-
54 Analysis by the Legislative Analyst, in VOTER GUIDE, supra note 10, at 104, 106.
55 See Maura Dolan, Trying to Speed Up Executions Could Deal ‘Mortal Blow’ to California
Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2017, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-
death-penalty-appeals-measure-20170402-story.html (asserting that the time limit is “completely un-
workable” and “would require the California Supreme Court to decide virtually nothing but death
penalty appeals for at least the next five years—almost no civil cases at all and no criminal cases
other than capital murder”).
56 Proposition 66, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE (Nov. 8, 2016), http://www.lao.ca.gov/
BallotAnalysis/Proposition?number=66&year=2016.
57 See Bobby Lee, Prop. 66, Which Speeds up State Death Penalty Process, is Challenged in
CA Supreme Court, DAILY CALIFORNIAN (June 12, 2017), http://www.dailycal.org/2017/06/12/prop-
66-speeds-state-death-penalty-process-challenged-ca-supreme-court (“The system is stuck because
we don’t have the necessary resources.”).
58 Dolan, supra note 55.
59 Id.
60 Amended & Renewed Petition for Extraordinary Relief at 2, Briggs v. Brown, 3 Cal. 5th
808 (2017) (No. S238309), https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wisbubhyoi2maz7/AAATRdd0FTZms0h-
h0zKjpy8a?dl=0&preview=4.+Petitioners-amended-renewed-pet-extraordinary-relief-S238309.pdf.
John Van de Kamp died after petition was filed, leaving Ron Briggs as the sole petitioner. See
Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 822 n.1.
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gued, and amici agreed,61 that Proposition 66’s five-year time limit
violates the separation of powers doctrine by materially impairing the
constitutional and inherent powers of the courts to resolve capital appeals
and habeas corpus cases.62
The named defendants included then-Governor Jerry Brown, then-
Attorney General Kamala Harris, Secretary of State Alex Padilla, and the
Judicial Council, which is the policymaking body for California’s
courts.63 Respondents were joined by Intervenor Californians to Mend,
Not End, the Death Penalty (“Intervenor”), “a campaign committee rep-
resenting the proponents of the initiative.”64 Chief Justice Tani Cantil-
Sakauye and Justice Ming W. Chin recused themselves from the case
because they are members of the Judicial Council, one of the aforemen-
tioned named defendants.65 In their place, California Courts of Appeal
Justices Andrea Lynn Hoch and Raymond J. Ikola sat pro tempore.66 The
California Supreme Court stayed the implementation of Proposition 66
on December 20, 2016,67 and granted review on February 1, 2017.68
Alleging a separation of powers violation, Petitioners argued that the
five-year requirement for capital review is an impracticable time limit
that divests the court of its constitutionally mandated judicial discre-
tion.69 Petitioners asserted that the time limit failed to provide for impor-
tant considerations, such as the complexity of a case, the substantiality of
the legal issues presented, and the possibility of an attorney having rea-
61 Amici in support of Petitioner were: Constitutional law professors Erwin Chemerinsky
(UCI), Kathryn Abrams (Berkeley), Rebecca Brown (USC), Devon Carbado (UCLA), Jennifer
Chacón (UCI), Sharon Dolovich (UCLA), David Faigman (Hastings), Ian F. Haney López (Berke-
ley), Karl M. Manheim (Loyola), Russell Robinson (Berkeley), Betrall Ross (Berkeley), and the
Brennan Center for Justice; California Appellate Defense Counsel; the Los Angeles County Bar
Association, the California Academy of Appellate Lawyers, the Beverly Hills Bar Association, and
the Bar Association of San Francisco; the California Appellate Project; the Habeas Corpus Resource
Center; California Attorneys for Criminal Justice and Death Penalty Focus; the Innocence Network,
American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, American Civil Liberties Union of Southern
California, and the American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego and Imperial Counties; and the
Offices of the Federal Public Defenders for the Central and Eastern Districts of California. Peti-
tioner’s Reply to Amicus Curiae Briefs at 1-2, Briggs v. Brown, 3 Cal. 5th 808 (2017) (No.
S238309).
62 Amended & Renewed Petition, supra note 60 at 14-15.
63 Petition for Extraordinary Relief at 4-5, Briggs v. Brown, 3 Cal. 5th 808 (2017) (No.
S238309), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/1-s238309-petitioners-pet-writ-mandate-req-stay-11
0916.pdf.
64 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 822.
65 Order Recusing Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye & Justice Chin, Briggs v. Brown, 3 Cal. 5th
808 (2017) (No. S238309), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2-s238309-orf-111616.pdf.
66 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 822.
67 Stay Order, Briggs v. Brown, 3 Cal. 5th 808 (2017) (No. S238309), http://www.courts.ca
.gov/documents/6-s238309-stf-122016.pdf.
68 Order to Show Cause, Briggs v. Brown, 3 Cal. 5th 808 (2017) (No. S238309).
69 Petition for Extraordinary Relief, supra note 63, at 32-34.
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sonable schedule limitations.70 Petitioners argued that the voters’ intent
to “impose obligatory guidelines” on the courts was evident based on the
following: (1) the initiative’s repeated use of the word “shall” instead of
“may;” (2) the consequences established by the initiative for a court’s
failure to meet the prescribed time limits; and (3) the fact that the ballot
materials informed voters that, if enacted, “Proposition 66 would impose
required time limits on the lengthy capital appeals process.”71
Petitioners asserted that a saving construction of the time limit
would be improper and would result in “legislation [that] would be un-
recognizable to the proponents who authored it and the voters who
adopted it.”72 Petitioners argued that construing the time limit provision
as directive instead of mandatory, by use of a saving construction, would
disregard the basic rule of statutory interpretation when a voter initiative
is challenged because such an interpretation would ignore the initiative’s
purpose and contradict the voters’ intent in enacting it.73
In response, Intervenor and Respondents conceded in their pleadings
that Proposition 66’s five-year time limit imposes a “required” deadline
on the courts that “was intended to be” enforceable through a petition for
writ of mandate.74 However, Respondents and Intervenor argued that the
required five-year time limit does not violate the separation of powers
doctrine because it is both a reasonable restriction on the constitutional
functions of the courts and a valid exercise of the legislature’s power to
regulate criminal proceedings.75 Notably, neither Respondents nor Inter-
venor argued in their pleadings that a saving construction was necessary
for the time limit to pass constitutional muster.76 Rather, the proponents
insisted that Proposition 66’s five-year time limit is not an “absolute or
inflexible rule” since it does not require an automatic issuance of a writ,
but provides for writ relief only when the court does not have “extraordi-
nary and compelling reasons justifying the delay.”77 The “time limit[ ]
70 Id. at 34.
71 Petitioner’s Reply to Amicus Curiae Briefs, supra note 61, at 9-10 (emphasis in original).
72 Id. at 12.
73 Id. at 9 (quoting Hodges v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 4th 109, 114 (1999)) (“In the case of a
voters’ initiative statute . . . [the court] may not properly interpret the measure in a way that the
electorate did not contemplate: the voters should get what they enacted, not more and not less.”).
74 Intervenor’s Brief in Reply to Amicus Curiae Briefs at 36, Briggs v. Brown, 3 Cal. 5th 808
(2017) (No. S238309); Respondents’ Preliminary Opposition to Petitioners’ Amended & Renewed
Petition for Extraordinary Relief at 4, Briggs v. Brown, 3 Cal. 5th 808 (2017) (No. S238309).
75 Respondents’ Preliminary Opposition to Amended Petition, supra note 74, at 12-16; Pre-
liminary Opposition of Intervenor to Petition for Extraordinary Relief at 37-41, Briggs v. Brown, 3
Cal. 5th 808 (2017) (No. S238309).
76 Respondents’ Preliminary Opposition to Amended Petition, supra note 74, at 13, 15-16;
Preliminary Opposition of Intervenor to Petition, supra note 75, at 40.
77 Intervenor’s Return to the Order to Show Cause at 41-42, Briggs v. Brown, 3 Cal. 5th 808
(2017) (No. S238309), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/28-s238309-intervener-written-return-
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[was] crafted with enough flexibility to preserve the judicial branch’s
ability ‘to properly and effectively function as a separate department.’”78
Thus, the proponents argued in their pleadings that the time limit does
not rise to the level of judicial infringement that constitutionally demands
a saving construction.79
However, admitting at oral argument that a five-year deadline would
“perhaps not” be constitutional, proponents argued—for the first time—
that the five-year requirement was actually not required; but instead as-
serted it was merely a “goal” that was really just “an invitation to take up
the question of how long these appeals should take.”80 Despite this reve-
lation at oral argument, nowhere in Respondents’ or Intervenor’s six cu-
mulative briefs, providing over 300 pages of argument, did either party
claim that the five-year time “requirement,” as it is repeatedly referred to
in their pleadings, warranted or required a directive interpretation.81
The court conceded that the five-year time limit is mandatory in
light of the language therein; the court also admitted that the voters be-
lieved the time limit would be “binding and enforceable.”82 Despite the
voters’ clear intent and the initiative’s mandatory purpose, the court
agreed with the initiative’s proponents that the five-year time limit may
be properly construed as directive, instead of mandatory.83
The California Supreme Court upheld Proposition 66 in a 5-2 ruling
on August 24, 2017.84 Finding that Petitioners’ constitutional challenges
did not warrant relief,85 the court effectuated the entirety of the initia-
tive’s proposed reforms, with one exception.86 To avoid serious separa-
tion of powers problems, the court modified the mandatory language of
the time limit provision to be interpreted in a “directive manner”—that
is, the time limit provisions that “appear to impose strict deadlines” on
030117.pdf; Text of Proposed Laws: Proposition 66, in VOTER GUIDE, supra note 10, at 212, § 3(e)
at 213.
78 Preliminary Opposition of Intervenor to Petition, supra note 75, at 40 (quoting Engram, 50
Cal. 4th at 1146).
79 Id. (quoting Engram, 50 Cal. 4th at 1151); see also Respondents’ Preliminary Opposition
to Amended Petition, supra note 74, at 15-16.
80 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 874-75 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
81 See Respondents’ Preliminary Opposition to Amended Petition, supra note 74; Inter-
venor’s Complaint in Intervention in Opposition to Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Mandate, Briggs
v. Brown, 3 Cal. 5th 808 (2017) (No. S238309); Intervenor’s Return to Order to Show Cause, supra
note 77; Intervenor’s Brief in Reply to Amicus Curiae Briefs, supra note 74; Respondent’s Reply to
Amicus Curiae Briefs, Briggs v. Brown, 3 Cal. 5th 808 (2017) (No. S238309); Respondent’s Return
to Petition for Writ of Mandate, Briggs v. Brown, 3 Cal. 5th 808 (2017) (No. S238309).
82 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 854; CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.6(d) (2018).
83 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 855; PENAL § 190.6(d).
84 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 862.
85 Id. at 823.
86 Id. at 860-62.
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the courts do not, but instead “serve as a benchmark to guide courts, if
meeting the limits is reasonably possible.”87
2. The Court’s Separation of Powers Analysis
In determining the constitutionality of the five-year time limit, the
court held that its sole function was to evaluate the initiative “legally in
light of established constitutional standards.”88 The court did not con-
sider “the economic or social wisdom or general propriety of the initia-
tive”89 nor the “possible interpretive or analytical problems that might
arise from the measure in the future.”90
In its separation of powers analysis, the court acknowledged that
California has a long-established precedent for finding that fixed time
limits on a court’s exercise of its judicial functions raise serious separa-
tion of powers concerns.91 However, the Briggs court’s underlying rea-
soning for applying a directive interpretation to the five-year time limit
was that it is within a court’s authority to “preserve[ ] jurisdiction and
maintain[ ] the separation of powers by holding that time limits phrased
in mandatory terms [are] merely directory.”92 The court acknowledged
that many other states have established that imposing fixed deadlines on
judicial decision-making is a quintessential violation of the separation of
powers doctrine.93 But none of the cases cited by the court upheld a
clearly mandatory and unconstitutional judicial time requirement by giv-
ing it a different interpretation; where a court found a time requirement
materially impaired the court’s exercise of its core functions, the statute
was struck down.94
The Briggs court asserted that California’s departure from invalidat-
ing an unconstitutional statute is preferable: “The California approach
has the benefit of allowing time limits set by the legislative branch to
87 Id. at 823, 860.
88 Id. at 828 (quoting Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 814 (1989)).
89 Id. (quoting Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 814).
90 Id. at 827 (quoting Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 341 (1990)) (internal quotations
omitted).
91 Id. at 849.
92 Id. at 851.
93 Id. at 851 & n.28.
94 See State v. Buser, 302 Kan. 1, 8-9 (2015); In re Grady, 348 N.W.2d 559, 570 (Wis. 1984);
Coate v. Omholt, 662 P.2d 591, 593 (Mont. 1983); Sands v. Albert Pike Motor Hotel, 434 S.W.2d
288, 291-92 (Ark. 1968); State ex rel. Kostas v. Johnson, 69 N.E.2d 592, 595 (Ind. 1946); Atchinson
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Long, 251 P. 486, 489 (Okla. 1926); Schario v. State, 138 N.E. 63, 64
(Ohio 1922); Resolute Ins. Co. v. Seventh Judicial Dist. Court of Okla. Cty., 336 F. Supp. 497, 503
(W.D. Okla. 1971); United States v. Brainer, 515 F. Supp. 627, 636 (D. Md. 1981); Cf. State ex rel.
Emerald People’s Util. v. Joseph, 640 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Or. 1982).
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function as nonbinding guidelines, when reasonably possible.”95 The
court cited Garrison, Engram, Thurmond, Shafter-Wasco, Lorraine, and
Verio as examples of a directive interpretation applied to an otherwise
mandatory statute to avoid a separation of powers violation.96 The court
asserted that these cases created nearly a century of precedent that a court
must “decline to infer that lawmakers intended strict adherence to a fixed
deadline that would undermine the courts’ authority as a separate branch
of government.”97
The court proffered two justifications for its directive interpretation
of the five-year time limit.98 First, the court claimed that the time limit
provision “provides no effective mechanism” of enforcement.99 Second,
the court refused to interpret the time limit provision “to conform with
the voters’ probable intent” because the voters were not “informed of the
details of an enforcement mechanism” or “how such an order could ef-
fectively result in compliance.”100
The first justification derives from the court’s reading of section
190.6(e). This provision establishes: “If a court fails to comply without
extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying the delay, either party or
any victim of the offense may seek relief by petition for writ of man-
date.”101 The court interpreted this provision as providing relief only for
a delay in filing the opening appellate brief, discussed in section
190.6(b), and not for a delay exceeding the five-year time limit, dis-
cussed in section 190.6(d).102 Those defending the initiative expressly
informed the court that subdivision (e) was intended to reference subdivi-
sion (d), and that the reference to subdivision (b) was a drafting error, but
the court dismissed these assertions.103
The court held that even if it did interpret the provision as the parties
intended, a directive interpretation was nevertheless appropriate because
the provision did not provide a “workable” means of enforcement.104 Fo-
cusing on the plausibility of writ relief to enforce the time limit, the court
95 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 851 & n.28.
96 Id. at 849-51, 853-54 (2017) (citing Garrison, 32 Cal. 2d 430; Engram, 50 Cal. 4th 1131;
Thurmond, 66 Cal. 2d 836; Shafter-Wasco, 55 Cal. App. 2d 484; Lorraine, 220 Cal. 753; Verio
Healthcare, Inc. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 5th 1315 (2016)).
97 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 858.
98 Id. at 855.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 857.
101 Text of Proposed Laws: Proposition 66, in VOTER GUIDE, supra note 10, at 212, § 3(e) at
213.
102 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 855; Text of Proposed Laws: Proposition 66, in VOTER GUIDE, supra
note 10, at 212, § 3(b), (d)-(e) at 213.
103 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 855.
104 Id. at 857.
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found that adherence to such a deadline is impractical because it would
require a “coordination of efforts by multiple courts and other actors” in
addition to substantial additional funding by the legislature.105 The court
also noted that writ relief requiring the California Supreme Court, the
state’s highest court, to comply with the deadline is not possible because
a writ must be issued to an inferior tribunal.106
The court’s second justification for upholding the time limit under a
directive interpretation goes to the heart of the issue: the intent of the
voters. The court found the voters intended to impose a mandatory and
enforceable judicial time limit, but the court declined to interpret the stat-
ute in a way that would accurately reflect the voters’ intent when such an
interpretation would render the provision unconstitutional as a violation
of the separation of powers.107 The court did not disagree that it was the
intention of the voters to have a mandatory five-year time limit, but the
court nevertheless refused to interpret it that way, holding that “[i]t has
never been our practice to rewrite a statute only to strike it down as
unconstitutional.”108 Because the voters were not “informed of the de-
tails of an enforcement mechanism” and how a writ of mandate “could
effectively result in compliance,” the court held that the voters did not
intend to “intrude on the right of the courts.”109
For the foregoing reasons, the court declined to conform with voter
intent by giving the time limit’s mandatory language effect.110 Instead,
the court held that the time limit is properly construed under a directive
interpretation “as an exhortation to the parties and the courts to handle
cases as expeditiously as is consistent with the fair and principled admin-
istration of justice.”111
III. CALIFORNIA’S CAPITAL CRISIS CONTINUES: THE BRIGGS RULING
FAILED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE REALITIES FACING THE
STATE’S CAPITAL SYSTEM
A. THE BRIGGS RULING’S EFFECT ON DEATH-ROW INMATES
Underlying the legal arguments proffered by both sides and the court
is the human reality: the initiative risks the execution of innocent people.
105 Id. at 856.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 857.
108 Id. (claiming that the drafting error would require the court to “rewrite” the provision).
109 Id. at 857-58.
110 Id. at 858.
111 Id. at 858-59 (citing Garrison, 32 Cal. 2d at 435-36; Shafter-Wasco, 55 Cal. App. 2d at
489).
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There is ample evidence to show that five years is not enough time for
inmates to prove their innocence on appeal. First, certain evidence may
not be available to the defendant until years later. “For every ten prison-
ers executed in the United States since 1976, one has been set free be-
cause of advances in DNA and other forensics.”112 Typically, it takes a
great deal of time for this evidence to be discovered. Second, reaching a
determination in a capital appeal is a tedious process, and the judiciary
must be afforded the necessary time to evaluate the voluminous records
inherent to a capital case. For all capital cases from 2000 to 2015, the
California Supreme Court overturned the death penalty in 8.46% of
cases, including 3.32% of cases where the verdict was reversed or the
judgment vacated.113 In cases where the court reversed a death sentence,
the average time under submission was 100 days; and in cases where a
death sentence was affirmed, the average time under submission was typ-
ically one-third shorter.114 This evidence demonstrates that it takes
longer for the court to determine a death-row inmate’s innocence. De-
spite its exceedingly large death-row population, California “has carried
out only 13 of the [total] 1,242 executions that have occurred” in the
United States since 1976.115 Notably, of the 13 capital inmates executed
in California, 2 were “volunteers” who requested execution after volunta-
rily withdrawing their appeals and habeas corpus petitions; thereby, Cali-
fornia has executed only 11 death-row inmates after completion of the
capital appellate review process.116
Accelerating the capital process threatens to create a criminal justice
structure that executes individuals before their guilt has been fully estab-
lished by the judicial appellate system. Specifically, the five-year time
limit fosters a system that is susceptible of executing an innocent person
because it demands that the courts “go faster” while failing to address the
major causes for the long delays in California death-penalty cases.
112 Mercury News Editorial Board, Prop. 66 Unfair to Death Row Inmates, MERCURY NEWS
(June 8, 2017, 1:31 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2017/06/08/editorial-prop-66-unfair-to-
death-row-inmates-and-bad-for-california; see also Samuel R. Gross et al., Innocence in Capital
Sentencing: Article: Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. Crim. L. & Crimi-
nology 523, 529 (2005) (there were 74 death sentence exonerations in the country between 1989 and
2003).
113 Kirk Jenkins, What is the Supreme Court’s Reversal Rate for Death Penalty Appeals?,
CAL. SUP. CT. REV. (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.californiasupremecourtreview.com/2017/01/what-
is-the-supreme-courts-reversal-rate-for-death-penalty-appeals.
114 Kirk Jenkins, How Long Does the Typical Death Penalty Appeal Take to Decide Follow-
ing the Oral Argument?, CAL. SUP. CT. REV. (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.californiasupremecour-
treview.com/2017/02/how-long-does-the-typical-death-penalty-appeal-take-to-decide-following-the-
oral-argument.
115 As of May 2011, 1,242 executions have been carried out in the country since 1976. See
Alarcón et al., supra note 8, at 51.
116 See CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUST., supra note 3, at 122 n.25.
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Merely telling the courts to “go faster” in their review of capital cases
without proper guidance or a means to achieve such a goal is an unwork-
able approach that does nothing to further justice, especially in a system
that is vulnerable to prejudice and discrimination.117 Capital cases are
lengthy in their appeals process because of the enormity, complexity, and
multitude of problems intrinsic to the nature of a death-penalty case,
which Proposition 66 fails to address or cure.118 Erwin Chemerinsky,
Dean of the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, observed
Proposition 66’s failure to address the realities of California’s capital
system: “The courts are proceeding with these cases as expeditiously as
possible under the circumstances, and imposing deadlines on the courts
will not address the shortage of lawyers to argue them or judges to hear
them.”119
B. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA’S DEATH-PENALTY SYSTEM:
DEATH ELIGIBILITY, VOTER INITIATIVES, AND INADEQUATE
FUNDING
The history of the state’s current death-penalty system is critical to
understanding the cause of its substantial death-row population. Strik-
ingly, California’s current death-penalty system has been adopted en-
tirely through voter initiatives.120 There are only 17 states that allow
constitutional amendment by voter initiative and of these 17 states, Cali-
fornia’s initiative process is deemed the most “extreme” for providing a
nearly unrestricted opportunity to amend the state’s constitution.121 Al-
though the death penalty was repealed in 1972 when the California Su-
preme Court ruled that the state’s capital-punishment system was
unconstitutional,122 California voters nullified the California Supreme
Court’s ruling by passing Proposition 17 only nine months later.123 Pro-
position 17 amended California’s Constitution to provide that the death
117 See generally Steven F. Shatz, The Meaning of “Meaningful Appellate Review” in Capital
Cases: Lessons from California, 56 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79, 130 (2016) (“On a national level,
numerous studies have found race, gender and geographic disparities in the administration of the
death penalty, the same disparities have been found in California.”).
118 See Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 867 (Liu, J., concurring).
119 Erwin Chemerinsky, Voters’ Attempt to Speed Executions Should be Quickly Nullified,
L.A. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 5, 2017, 12:25 PM), http://www.dailynews.com/2017/04/05/voters-attempt-
to-speed-executions-should-be-quickly-nullified-erwin-chemerinsky.
120 Shatz, supra note 117, at 94.
121 Alarcón et al., supra note 8, at 115, 118; Ronald M. George, State Constitution, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 1515, 1516 (2010).
122 People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 656-57 (1972).
123 Alarcón et al., supra note 8, at 131-32.
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penalty is not cruel and unusual punishment, which effectively reinstated
the death penalty.124
Several years later, voters passed Proposition 7, also known as the
1978 Briggs Death Penalty Initiative, which broadened the list of crimes
that qualify a defendant for capital punishment.125 The Briggs Initia-
tive126 was intended to give “Californians the toughest death-penalty law
in the country” by creating a capital system “which threatens to inflict
the penalty on the maximum number of defendants.”127 And that it has
done. In 2010, the largest and most comprehensive study ever conducted
of death-sentence rates in California evaluated 27,453 homicide cases
from 1978 to 2002 and found that California has “the highest [rate] in the
nation by every measure” with a 95% death-eligibility rate.128 This
study, performed by David C. Baldus and his colleagues, confirmed that
the scope of California’s death-penalty system is the largest in the coun-
try129 because there is a broader category of crimes that qualify a crimi-
nal defendant for the death penalty in California than in any other state.
Following the 1978 Briggs Initiative, “California voters passed six
additional crime initiatives, each one further broadening the scope of
California’s death penalty by expanding the list of death-eligible crimes,”
making it easier for a defendant to receive a death sentence.130 As of
2019, California Penal Code section 190.2 enumerates 33 special circum-
stances that qualify a first-degree murder convict for the death penalty.131
This list of special circumstances qualifies almost all forms of first-de-
gree murder for death sentence consideration.132 The breadth of the spe-
cial circumstances creates an extraordinarily large pool of defendants
who are potentially eligible to receive a death sentence, qualifying 87%
of all first-degree murders committed in the state for the death penalty.133
For example, California is one of only five states where “an uninten-
124 Id. at 131-32.
125 Id. at 138 (2011); see also Shatz, supra note 117, at 94.
126 The 1978 Briggs Initiative was written by State Senator John Briggs, the father of the
challenger of Proposition 66, Ron Briggs, in Briggs v. Brown, 3 Cal. 5th 808 (2017). See Amended
& Renewed Petition, supra note 60, at 4.
127 Shatz, supra note 117, at 94.
128 Id. at 111.
129 Id.
130 Alarcón et al., supra note 8, at 49.
131 Under this section, there are 22 “numbered special circumstances, one of which (felony-
murder) has” 12 separate sub-parts; this list of death-eligible crimes includes such circumstances as
the intentional killing of a peace officer, murder committed for financial gain or to escape arrest, and
murder committed (by anyone) during the defendant’s attempted first or second-degree burglary. See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (2018); Shatz, supra note 117, at 95 n.90.
132 Shatz, supra note 117, at 95; CAL. PENAL CODE § 189(a) (2018) (providing the scope of
“first-degree murder” in California).
133 CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUST., supra note 3, at 177.
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tional, even wholly accidental, killing during a felony” would make a
defendant death-sentence eligible.134 California’s overbroad definition of
death eligibility is arguably the very source of the state’s dysfunctional
and lengthy capital-punishment system because it undermines the sys-
tem’s objective to ensure that the “very worst members of our society”
are put to death.135 Since the enactment of the state’s current death-pen-
alty law in 1978, a total of 930 individuals have received a death sen-
tence.136 Presently, an average of 20 individuals receives a death
sentence in California annually.137
Delays are pervasive throughout all stages of the appellate process
as a result of minimal judicial resources for adjudicating these volumi-
nous and intensive cases.138 On average, it can take approximately three-
to-five years for appointment of appellate counsel, two years before a
case is heard by the California Supreme Court after filing briefs, eight-to-
ten years for appointment of counsel for habeas corpus petitions, and two
years for the California Supreme Court to reach a decision after a petition
has been filed.139 These lengthy delays illustrate the growing problem
California faces in having both an overbroad list of death-eligible crimes
and grossly inadequate funds to litigate the large pool of capital defend-
ants.140 Any attempt to systematically remedy the delays thereby requires
careful consideration of these issues.
C. THE BRIGGS COURT NEGLECTED ITS DUTY TO PROVIDE
MEANINGFUL APPELLATE REVIEW
The Briggs court failed to use its judicial power to strike down a law
that effectively threatens to encourage arbitrary and capricious appellate
review of capital cases—the very cases that justice demands a higher
procedural standard for to ensure consistency in the imposition of the
134 The other four states where an unintentional, accidental killing during a felony qualifies
for the death penalty are Florida, Georgia, Idaho, and Mississippi. See Shatz, supra note 117, at 96
n.94 (citing People v. Watkins, 290 P.3d 364, 390 (2013)).
135 Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Canary Lecture: Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sen-
tence, 46 CASE W. RES. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1995).
136 Proposition 66, supra note 56.
137 Id.
138 Alarcón et al., supra note 8, at 49, 80. Upon receiving a death sentence, all capital defend-
ants have the right to an automatic direct appeal, which is reviewed by the California Supreme Court
to determine whether the defendant was given a fair trial. Capital defendants also have a constitu-
tional right to file a habeas corpus petition, which has historically been reviewed by the California
Supreme Court as well. See generally Alarcón, supra note 6, at 715.
139 CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUST., supra note 3, at 122-23.
140 See Alarcón et al., supra note 8, at 47, 184.
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death sentence.141 When faced with a constitutional challenge to legisla-
tion, it is the responsibility of the court to render “constitutional rulings
clear enough to foster meaningful deliberation” and provide proper gui-
dance for those entrusted with the fair and efficient administration of
justice.142 The importance of this principle is amplified in capital cases
where the concept of “meaningful appellate review” emphasizes the ne-
cessity of “procedural protections that are intended to ensure that the
death penalty [is] imposed in a consistent, rational manner.”143
By upholding the five-year time limit under a construction that di-
rectly conflicts with the intent of the voters, as evidenced by the lan-
guage of the ballot materials, the court validated the drafting of
unworkable legislation and authorized the very thing that it is entrusted
to protect against in capital cases: unconstitutional and arbitrary judicial
rulings subject to broad and unguided discretion.144 The court held that
such an interpretation of the time-limit provisions does not “empty them
of meaning” because it will still “serve as [a] benchmark[ ] to guide
courts.”145 But a time limit cannot serve as a meaningful benchmark
when it “purports to dictate what is not ‘reasonably possible’ to achieve,”
which is precisely the case with the five-year time limit in 190.6(d).146
The extent of the five-year time limit’s infeasibility is unmistakable
when viewed in light of the history and ramifications of California’s cap-
ital appellate process.147 Reasonable direction on how to meet the five-
year time limit requires much more than a mere command for the courts
to “speed up” the process. It requires a drastic reorganization of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court’s functions, a more thorough plan for restructuring
the lower courts, and a substantial increase in funding from the legisla-
ture.148 Absent any such discussion or direction, the five-year time limit
fails to provide meaningful guidance for the reforms now in effect.149
Although it may be easier to simply hold that the five-year time limit
is merely directive, the California Supreme Court has a duty to carry out
its judicial function as the last resort of legislative interpretation, which
141 Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 321 (1991) (“We have emphasized repeatedly the crucial
role of meaningful appellate review in ensuring that the death penalty is not imposed arbitrarily or
irrationally.”).
142 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 876 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
143 Shatz, supra note 117, at 81 (citing Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 960 (1983) (Stevens,
J., dissenting)).
144 See generally id. (“meaningful appellate review” is meant to ensure that “the death penalty
will be imposed in a consistent, rational manner”).
145 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 860.
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includes declaring laws unconstitutional when they materially impair a
court’s core constitutional functions by encroaching on its discretion.150
Under the separation of powers doctrine, the judiciary is required to un-
dertake the indisputably challenging task of simultaneously protecting
the powers of all three branches of government while making “reasoned
calls on claims of encroachment”—a “tall order, and an impossible one
without a good rule of decision.”151 This is no easy task, “but fidelity to
its duty requires a measure of fortitude.”152 Petitioners provided the court
with an opportunity to address the issues that a poorly drafted and un-
derfunded initiative will inevitably incite, especially when considering
the vulnerability of California’s overwhelmed capital system. The Briggs
court missed this opportunity. By upholding, rather than invalidating, the
time limit under an interpretation that conflicts with the provision’s statu-
tory intent, the Briggs court failed to perform its duty as the state’s high-
est court and make the call that it was created to make. The so-called
saving construction of Proposition 66 will “save” no one. It is unwork-
able for the courts who are tasked with applying it and it is unjust for the
people that it will inevitably and harshly effect. Justice is, or at least it
should be, a process and not a rush to the finish line.
IV. A DIRECTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE FIVE-YEAR TIME LIMIT IS
IMPROPER BECAUSE THE VOTERS INTENDED FOR IT TO BE
MANDATORY
In interpreting the initiative, the court made a grave misstep by pro-
viding a directive—rather than mandatory—reading of the five-year time
limit. A court’s determination of the constitutionality of legislation relies
solely on an evaluation of the challenged statute’s language to assess the
law’s purpose and intent.153 The judiciary “has no power to rewrite [a]
statute so as to make it conform to a presumed intention which is not
expressed.”154 Instead, courts are “limited to interpreting the statute, and
such interpretation must be based on the language used” therein.155
150 See Alarcón et al., supra note 8, at 160 (“With the hands of the executive and legislators
tied by an initiative process that authorizes voters to enact legislation that cannot be vetoed by the
Governor or amended or repealed by the Legislature, the California courts have been called upon to
assume an increasingly important role in construing the reach of the California initiative process.”).
151 David A. Carrillo & Danny Y. Chou, California Constitutional Law: Separation of Pow-
ers, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 655, 687-88 (2011).
152 Id. at 687 n.191 (“The preservation of a viable constitutional government is not a task for
wimps.” (quoting Obrien v. Jones, 999 P.2d 95, 122 (2000) (Brown, J., dissenting))).
153 See Seaboard Acceptance Corp. v. Shay, 214 Cal. 361, 365-66 (1931).
154 Id. at 365.
155 Id. (emphasis added).
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The dispositive question the Briggs court was enlisted to consider
was whether a death-penalty system that imposes mandatory time limits
on the courts was what the voters intended.156 The key problem with the
court’s ruling is that a directive interpretation does not reflect the law’s
purpose nor the voters’ intent. Proposition 66’s language demonstrates
the mandatory intent and purpose of the five-year time limit because (1)
it provides a method of enforcement for failure to meet the time limit, (2)
it consistently used mandatory language throughout the initiative and
ballot materials, and (3) precedent does not support supplying a directive
interpretation of a statute that expresses a mandatory intent and provides
for a method of enforcement.
A. THE VOTERS INTENDED FOR THE TIME LIMIT TO BE MANDATORY
BECAUSE THE PROVISION PROVIDED FOR ENFORCEMENT BY
WRIT OF MANDATE
The court’s interpretation of 190.6(e), the provision that establishes
relief by writ of mandate,157 is misguided and unreasonable. Placing
fixed time limits on the judiciary has been long understood in California
to be a latent separation of powers violation because it materially impairs
a court’s ability to determine and manage its docket.158 An intent to ma-
terially impair the courts’ constitutional function to hear and decide cases
by imposing time requirements may not be read into the statute, but in-
stead must be clear from the language of the statute or otherwise clearly
indicated to be the underlying purpose of the statute.159 When a statute
provides a penalty or consequence for the failure to meet the prescribed
time requirement, it strongly suggests a legislative intent to control the
court’s functions.160
The Briggs court’s evaluation of the penalty provision for the time
limit appears focused only on whether the relief provided by the provi-
sion was plausible, despite the importance of determining the legislative
156 See Alarcón et al., supra note 8, at 161 (quoting Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of
San Jose, 24 Cal. 4th 537, 576 (2000) (George, J., dissenting)) (“In construing constitutional or
statutory provisions, whether enacted by the Legislature or by initiative, the intent of the enacting
body is the paramount consideration. . . . [I]n reviewing a voter initiative’s validity, the Court’s ‘task
is simply to interpret and apply the initiative’s language so as to effectuate the electorate’s intent.’”).
157 Text of Proposed Laws: Proposition 66, in VOTER GUIDE, supra note 10, at 212, § 3(e) at
213.
158 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 849.
159 Garrison, 32 Cal. 2d at 435.
160 See Gowanlock v. Turner, 42 Cal. 2d 296, 301 (1954) (“The requirements of a statute are
directory, not mandatory, unless means be provided for its enforcement.”); Garrison, 32 Cal. 2d at
435.
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intent when undertaking a question of statutory interpretation.161 Al-
though the question of plausibility of the stated relief is a useful factor in
reaching a final determination on the legislative intent, the intent and
purpose of the statute should be the ultimate question before the court—
especially when the challenged statute was passed by voter initiative.162
When analyzed with the question of legislative intent in mind, it is clear
that the voters who passed Proposition 66 intended to set a mandatory
time limit on the courts and to enforce that time requirement by writ of
mandate; the fact that writ relief in such a situation is implausible should
be of minor significance considering the general voter population, al-
though entrusted to enact important criminal law and policy, does not
have exhaustive knowledge or understanding of the criminal process or
judicial procedure.163
The significance of looking to whether a provision includes an en-
forcement mechanism is important for determining whether a directive or
mandatory reading is appropriate because it indicates that the voters in-
tended for the law to have a binding and enforceable effect. The fact that
the enforcement mechanism may not, in actuality, have a binding or en-
forceable effect does not diminish the voters’ mandatory intent in passing
the law. Thereby, the Briggs court’s focus on the impracticality of the
enforcement mechanism was improper because such an inquiry is irrele-
vant to the determination of the voters’ intent and the purpose of the
initiative.
The majority opinion acknowledged that the five-year time limit “re-
flect[s] the voters’ will, which [the court] respect[s]” but continued that it
was “presented to the voters . . . without the benefit of hearings or re-
search exploring their feasibility or their impact on the rest of the courts’
work.”164 However, it was not for the court to decide whether the chosen
enforcement mechanism would be effective. “In order to further the fun-
damental right of the electorate to enact legislation through the initiative
process, [courts] must on occasion indulge in a presumption that the vot-
ers thoroughly study and understand the content of complex initiative
measures.”165
161 See Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 856-57 (holding that since “there is no tribunal to issue a writ of
mandate to this court” the five-year time limit “provides no workable means of [enforcement]”).
162 See, e.g., Hodges v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 4th 109, 114-18 (1999) (holding that statutory
interpretation of a voter initiative requires a determination of the electorate’s purpose, “as indicated
in the ballot arguments and elsewhere”).
163 See Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 887 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting) (“[the court has] never required the
voters to sit through a constitutional law lecture before [it] would be willing to interpret a law as it
was written”).
164 Id. at 860-61.
165 Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 51 Cal. 3d
744, 768 (1990).
23
Nathaniel: California’s Capital Crisis Continues
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2019
192 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
Thereby, the Briggs court’s singular task was to decide whether the
voters intended to place a mandatory limitation on the court’s authority
to decide its cases while presuming that the voters studied and under-
stood what they enacted. While certain judicial time limits are properly
construed as directive, mandatory effect must be supplied when “the lan-
guage contains negative words” or otherwise “shows that the designation
of the time was intended as a limitation of power, authority or right,”
such as by including a method of enforcement.166 It is inappropriate for a
court to interpret a ballot initiative based on the electorate’s knowledge
of the legal process. But if it was, then perhaps it is time to reconsider the
acceptable scope of legislative power afforded to the voters when there is
a lack of faith in their knowledge of the processes in which they may
enact legislation. “Our society being complex, the rules governing it
whether adopted by legislation or initiative will necessarily be complex.
Unless we are to repudiate or cripple use of the initiative, risk of confu-
sion must be borne.”167
Next, in addition to the court’s misguided focus on the provision’s
plausibility of enforcement, the court’s interpretation of 190.6(e) is fur-
ther undermined by its inherent unreasonableness. The provision estab-
lishes relief by writ of mandate if “a court fails to comply” with the time
requirement.168 If read as the court here instructs, the provision would
allow relief for something that never happens: the filing of an opening
brief by the court itself. How can a court fail to comply with the filing of
an opening brief? The answer: it cannot. Section 190.6(e) was meant to
provide an enforcement mechanism for the five-year time limit—a fact
further evidenced by Proposition 66’s proponent’s statements at oral ar-
gument. Intervenor expressly admitted to the court that the provision’s
reference to subdivision (b) was merely a drafting error, and that subdivi-
sion (e) was intended to reference a delay in relation to subdivision (d),
which prescribed the five-year time limit, and not to a delay in filing the
opening brief found in subdivision (b).169 Nevertheless, the court insisted
that such an error was not clearly apparent.170 Yet, taking into considera-
tion all of the ballot materials and summaries of the law, it is distinctly
evident that the writ relief provided in 190.6(e) was for a delay in excess
of the five-year time limit.171
166 Pulcifer v. County of Alameda, 29 Cal. 2d 258, 262 (1946).
167 Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Superior Court of L.A. Cty., 25 Cal. 3d 33, 42 (1979).
168 Text of Proposed Laws: Proposition 66, in VOTER GUIDE, supra note 10, at 212, § 3(e) at
213.
169 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 855.
170 Id.
171 See Text of Proposed Laws: Proposition 66, in VOTER GUIDE, supra note 10, at 212, § 3 at
213 (codified at CAL. PENAL Code § 190.6(d)-(e) (2018)).
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First, the court’s interpretation of 190.6(e) does not provide a practi-
cal construction of the statute.172 As is reasonably understood, a court
could not and does not file the opening brief for an appeal. Thus, the
court could never be the cause of such a delay. Further, 190.6(e) provides
relief for a party against a court.173 Under the court’s interpretation, it
would provide a party the opportunity to compel a court’s adherence to
the briefing schedule for the opening appellate brief. This is an illogical
conclusion and would imply that an appealing party would seek a court
order to compel itself to file its own brief.
The penalty provision’s mistaken reference to subdivision (b) and
intended reference to subdivision (d) is further supported by the last sen-
tence of 190.6(e), which states “Paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) of Sec-
tion 28 of Article I of the California Constitution, regarding standing to
enforce victim’s rights’, applies to this subdivision and subdivision
(d).”174 This language makes it apparent that writ relief was intended for
a delay that exceeds the five-year time limit in subdivision (d), and not
for a delay in filing the opening brief in subdivision (b).175 The court’s
finding that subdivision (e) applies to subdivision (b) effectively renders
the last sentence of subdivision (e) moot as pointless, unenforceable, ex-
cess verbiage, which is an improper exercise of judicial statutory
interpretation.176
Second, even if the intended reference to subdivision (d) was not
facially obvious from the provision’s text, it is easily discernible from the
ballot materials and summaries of the law.177 The ballot materials in-
formed voters several times that the five-year time limit was “required”
and was enforceable by “writ of mandate.”178 Additionally, under the
unambiguous heading, “Requires Completion of Direct Appeal and
Habeas Corpus Petition Process Within Five Years,” the analysis by the
Legislative Analyst expressly stated the relief available to enforce the
time limit: “If the process takes more than five years, victims or their
attorneys could request a court order to address the delay.”179
In light of the clear language of the ballot materials and proposed
law expressly providing for a method of enforcement, the proponents’
assertions about the intent of the provision despite the drafting error, and
172 Id. § 3(e) at 213.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 PENAL § 190.6(b), (d)-(e).
176 See, e.g., People v. Rizo, 22 Cal. 4th 681, 687 (2000) (the courts must avoid interpreting
statutory language “in a manner that would render some part of the statute surplusage”).
177 Analysis by the Legislative Analyst, in VOTER GUIDE, supra note 10, at 104, 104-09.
178 Id.
179 Analysis by the Legislative Analyst, in VOTER GUIDE, supra note 10, at 104, 106.
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the nonsensical meaning the provision would derive from the court’s in-
terpretation, it is evident that the court erred in finding that the provision
did not provide for an enforcement mechanism.
B. THE VOTERS’ MANDATORY INTENT IS EVIDENT FROM THE
LANGUAGE IN THE BALLOT MATERIALS AND TEXT OF THE
PROPOSED LAW
The court’s second justification for applying a directive interpreta-
tion equally fails to provide an adequate basis for its ruling because the
language in the ballot materials and text of the law expresses the voters’
intent for the five-year time limit to be mandatory. Upholding the time
limit under a directive interpretation, the court reasoned that “in the ab-
sence of clearer indications that this was the voters’ intent, we will not
presume they meant to hamper the courts in the conduct of their busi-
ness.”180 As Justice Cuéllar noted in his dissenting opinion, the court’s
directive interpretation can at best be described as a “novel reinterpreta-
tion” of the five-year time limit that is “at odds—entirely—with what the
initiative says, how it was designed to work, and how it was sold.”181
The fundamental problem with the Briggs ruling is that a directive
interpretation does not accurately depict the purpose and intent of the
law, as reflected in the language and terms of the initiative. To “resolve
questions of purpose and ambiguity, ‘[courts] look to the materials
before the voters.’”182 Leading up to the polls, all ballot materials and
information on Proposition 66 provided to voters directly and expressly
indicated that the proposed time-limit changes to the capital review pro-
cess were to impose a required (i.e., mandatory) time frame for the courts
to decide capital appeals.183 These materials are often the sole source of
information that a person relies on when making a decision on how to
vote.184
Nothing in the language of Proposition 66’s voter materials stated or
implied that time limits may be imposed; instead, it was clearly stated
that time limits will be imposed. The ballot summary, ballot label, and
ballot title are key in determining the voters’ intent.185 Here, the Voter’s
Information Guide stated that “A YES vote on this measure means” that
“[c]ourt procedures for challenges to death sentences would be subject to
180 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 858.
181 Id. at 875 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
182 People v. Valencia, 3 Cal. 5th 347, 364 (2017) (quoting Robert L. v. Superior Court of
Orange Cty., 30 Cal. 4th 894, 905 (2003)).
183 Quick Reference Guide, in VOTER GUIDE, supra note 10, at 8, 15.
184 Alarcón et al., supra note 8, at 128.
185 See id. at 161-62.
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various changes, such as time limits on those challenges.”186 As such, the
first thing voters were told was that if they voted “yes” then time limits
would be imposed.187
Throughout the text of the initiative and related ballot materials,
“time limits” and the need to “expedite” was referenced consistently.188
The voters were expressly informed that Proposition 66 “places time lim-
its on legal challenges to death sentences” by: (1) requiring completion
of the direct appeal and habeas corpus petition process within five years;
(2) requiring filing of habeas corpus petitions within one year of attorney
appointment; and (3) placing other limitations “to help meet the above
time frames,” such as restricting a defendant from filing more than one
habeas corpus petition, with limited exceptions.189 Viewed in its entirety,
Proposition 66 was drafted to impose restrictive time limits on the judici-
ary for the purpose of “shorten[ing] the time that legal challenges to
death sentences take.”190 This clear intention is unambiguously commu-
nicated by the language used throughout Proposition 66’s ballot materi-
als regarding the initiative’s purpose and objective: “places time limits
on legal challenges to death sentences;” “[t]he measure requires that the
direct appeal and habeas corpus petition review process be completed
within five years;” “[e]stablishes time frame for state court death penalty
review;” “the measure requires that [all currently pending challenges] be
completed within five years from when the Judicial Council adopts re-
vised rules;” “[i]n order to help meet the above time frames, the measure
places other limits on legal challenges to death sentences.”191
Not only did the court ignore the clear intent and purpose of the
provision, the court also failed to abide by the centuries-old precedent of
statutory interpretation.192
It is a general rule of statutory construction that the courts will inter-
pret a measure adopted by vote of the people in such manner as to give
effect to the intent of the voters adopting it. It must be held that the
voters judged of the amendment they were adopting by the meaning
apparent on its face according to the general use of the words
employed.193
186 Quick Reference Guide, in VOTER GUIDE, supra note 10, at 8, 15.
187 Id.
188 Analysis by the Legislative Analyst, in VOTER GUIDE, supra note 10, at 104, 104-09; Text
of Proposed Laws: Proposition 66, in VOTER GUIDE, supra note 10, at 212, § 3(e) at 212-14.
189 Analysis by the Legislative Analyst, in VOTER GUIDE, supra note 10, at 104, 106.
190 Id. at 105.
191 Id. at 104-07.
192 See Kaiser v. Hopkins, 6 Cal. 2d 537, 538-39 (1936).
193 Id. at 538 (emphasis added).
27
Nathaniel: California’s Capital Crisis Continues
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2019
196 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
The initiative power of the people to enact and amend state law in-
herently demands that voters “get what they enacted, not more and not
less.”194 Giving more than what the voters passed by initiative oversteps
the reach of the initiative power, while giving less undercuts the power—
just as the authority of the three distinct branches of government must be
balanced to maintain a just society, so too must the power of the people.
Petitioners recognized that a directive interpretation of the time limit
would be an improper reach because such an interpretation would not
give the voters what they passed by initiative.195 Thus, Petitioners urged
the court to consider what a directive version of the time limits would
have looked like in the ballot materials if that was, in fact, the intent and
purpose of the proposition.196 Petitioners advanced an example, “En-
courages Completion of Direct Appeal and Habeas Corpus Petition Pro-
cess Within Five Years,” and challenged the court to consider whether
the results at the polls would have seen the same, or even a remotely
similar, outcome.197 When viewed holistically, it is difficult to find a
basis for not agreeing with Petitioner. If the ballot materials had indi-
cated anything but a mandatory time requirement, it cannot be asserted
that the same results would have patently ensued. The question remains
how the court reached its decision and upheld a time limit that was un-
mistakably and concededly not what the voters passed, especially when
such provisions potentiate grave consequences for the courts and capital
defendants.
It is impossible to construe the provision in a way that both main-
tains its constitutionality and accurately reflects the will of the voters
because all of the language in the voter materials indicated that the time
requirement is mandatory. The only valid and reasonable conclusion the
court could have—and should have—reached was to declare the measure
unconstitutional in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. The
court’s failure to issue a decision that accurately reflects the will of the
voters who passed it is regrettable and deeply unfortunate for Califor-
nia’s criminal justice system.
The Briggs court’s exercise of its duty to “jealously guard the pre-
cious initiative power”198 appears to have crossed the line from proper to
inappropriate. The court did not “jealously guard” the initiative power by
applying a directive interpretation to the time limit requirement in Pro-
position 66.199 The court failed to properly rule on the constitutionality
194 Hodges v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 4th 109, 114 (1999).
195 See Petitioner’s Reply to Amicus Curiae Briefs, supra note 61, at 12.
196 Id.
197 Id. (emphasis in original).
198 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 827 (quoting Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 501 (1991)).
199 Id. (quoting Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 501).
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of the initiative that the voters passed and instead adopted an interpreta-
tion of the time limit provision that undermines the central objective of
the initiative.200 A directive reading of the five-year time limit is incon-
sistent with the court’s statutory interpretation power: “[w]hen the lan-
guage of a statute is ‘clear and unambiguous’ and thus not reasonably
susceptible of more than one meaning, ‘there is no need for [judicial]
construction, and courts should not indulge in it.’”201 To construe Pro-
position 66’s time limit as directive in order to uphold its constitutional-
ity is to enact legislation that was not passed by the people. Such an act
of judicial construction is outside the authority of the court’s power of
statutory interpretation, and in conflict with the purpose of the constitu-
tional avoidance canon.
C. PRECEDENT DOES NOT SUPPORT A DIRECTIVE INTERPRETATION IN
BRIGGS
The Briggs court mistakenly asserted that its holding follows “nine
decades of precedent.”202 The saving construction the Briggs court im-
plemented goes well beyond established precedent and takes a vague,
blanket approach in evaluating the statute, devoid of the reasoning on
which it relies. Justice Cuéllar, in his dissenting opinion, distinguished
the majority’s directive saving construction from the constitutional
avoidance canon, arguing that the majority misused the principle when it
attempted to save an unsound construction.203 “[I]t is one thing to declare
a statute unconstitutional when it cannot be saved, yet quite another to
pretend a statute means what it does not simply so it can be saved.”204
The court maintained that because the ballot materials did not make
clear how a court order by writ of mandate could “effectively result in
compliance,” it was proper to construe the mandatory provision as direc-
tive.205 The court reasoned that because it would be impossible to inter-
pret 190.6 in a manner that would both “conform with the voters’
probable intent” and maintain its constitutionality, it was appropriate to
effectively rewrite the statute as directive to avoid a separation of powers
violation and preserve judicial authority.206 However, the court improp-
erly disregarded the initiative’s purpose, even when a remedy was clearly
200 See id. at 857-58.
201 People v. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th 605, 621 (1996) (quoting Cal. Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n
v. City of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 4th 342, 349 (1995)) (overruled in part on separate issue).
202 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 858.
203 Id. at 876-77, 900-01 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
204 Id. at 876-77.
205 Id. at 857 (majority opinion).
206 Id. at 857-58.
29
Nathaniel: California’s Capital Crisis Continues
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2019
198 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
articulated in the text of the law that illustrated the mandatory effect the
voters intended by passing the five-year time limit.
The court cited Garrison, Engram, Thurmond, Shafter-Wasco, Lor-
raine, and Verio to support a directive interpretation of an otherwise
mandatory statute to avoid a separation of powers violation.207 These
cases, however, are distinguishable and do not support the Briggs ruling.
Each of the court’s cited cases advanced the legislative purpose by inter-
preting the law as directive, which is precisely the opposite of what a
directive interpretation of the five-year time limit achieves.208
In Garrison, the statute at issue required a trial court to rule on all
issues arising from a contested election within ten days of trial.209 The
parties were opposing candidates in a local election and the initial poll
results rendered the defendant, who secured two more votes than the
plaintiff, the victor.210 The plaintiff challenged the election results and
the trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff, finding that the correct
poll results showed that the plaintiff won the election by five votes.211
On appeal, the defendant sought reversal of the trial court’s judgment,
arguing that the court lost jurisdiction to decide the case because its deci-
sion was not filed within the statutorily required ten-day time frame.212
The California Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s claim, holding
that the statute’s purpose would not be furthered by a mandatory applica-
tion of the time limit.213 Instead, the court held that a directive interpreta-
tion of the statute was appropriate despite its mandatory language
because the statute’s purpose was premised on the public’s valid concern
with the fair, accurate, and timely determination of election results.214
The court reasoned that, while speed in deciding contested-election cases
is a desirable component of the statute’s primary objective, it is “not the
primary statutory aim but is merely incidental to the main purpose of the
law.”215 A literal application of the statute would strip the court of juris-
diction, consequently defeating the primary purpose of the statute to de-
termine which candidate is rightfully entitled to office.216
207 Id. at 849-54 (citing Garrison, 32 Cal. 2d 430; Engram, 50 Cal. 4th 1131; Thurmond, 66
Cal. 2d 836; Shafter-Wasco, 55 Cal. App. 2d 484; Lorraine, 220 Cal. 753; Verio, 3 Cal. App. 5th
1315).
208 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 879 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
209 Garrison, 32 Cal. 2d at 434.
210 Id. at 433.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 437.
214 Id. at 436.
215 Id. at 436-37.
216 Id. at 437.
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Despite the Briggs court’s assertion to the contrary, the statute at
issue in Garrison is notably inapposite from Proposition 66.217 In Garri-
son, the court held that the statute must be construed as directive because
the law’s purpose was to ascertain “the will of the people at the polls,
fairly, honestly, and legally expressed,” which would be negated if speed
in reaching a judicial decision was given priority.218 The time limit in
Garrison was motivated by the public’s desire and right to ensure that
only officials who were elected by the voters hold a seat in public of-
fice.219 This right of the people naturally includes an importance for
timeliness, secondary to its primary objective, since a judicial determina-
tion may be required before the rightful candidate can take office. In
contrast, Proposition 66’s five-year time limit on capital appellate review
was not intended to protect a predominant public interest aside from a
mere desire to shorten the time frame that death challenges take.220
Speed is not “merely incidental” to the time limit’s purpose, as it was in
Garrison,221 but instead is the sole objective of the entire initiative.
Speeding up the capital appellate review process was repeatedly ad-
dressed in Proposition 66’s ballot materials.222 The ballot pamphlet’s
summary of the proposition began by unmistakably stating the initia-
tive’s ultimate objective: “This measure seeks to shorten the time legal
challenges to death sentences take.”223 The initiative was presented to
voters as a “reform” to the death-penalty process and stated that “Califor-
nia’s death penalty system is ineffective because of waste, delays, and
inefficiencies.”224 To support the reform and address the delays, the bal-
lot materials stated that murder-victim families “should not have to wait
decades” for capital appeals to be decided.225 To ensure such “timely
justice” for victim’s families, the findings and declarations concluded
that, if enacted, capital cases “can be fully and fairly reviewed by both
state and federal courts within ten years.”226 The initiative expressly pro-
vided that “state courts shall complete” the capital appellate review pro-
217 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 858 (citing Garrison, 32 Cal. 2d 430).
218 Garrison, 32 Cal. 2d at 436-37 (“[W]ords otherwise generally mandatory or permissive
will be given a different meaning when the provisions of the statute, properly construed, require it.”).
219 Garrison, 32 Cal. 2d at 434, 436.
220 See Analysis by the Legislative Analyst, in VOTER GUIDE, supra note 10, at 104, 105
(“This measure seeks to shorten the time that the legal challenges to death sentences take.”).
221 Garrison, 32 Cal. 2d at 436-37.
222 Text of Proposed Laws: Proposition 66, in VOTER GUIDE, supra note 10, at 212, 212-214;
Analysis by the Legislative Analyst, in VOTER GUIDE, supra note 10, at 104, 104-109.
223 Id. at 105.
224 Text of Proposed Laws: Proposition 66, in VOTER GUIDE, supra note 10, at 212, §§ 1-
2(1).
225 Id. § 2(3) at 213.
226 Id. § 2(10) at 213.
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cess within five years of the entry of judgment.227 The legislative intent
underlying Proposition 66 was similarly expressed throughout the ballot
materials: the analysis by the Legislative Analyst referred to the five-year
time limit in mandatory language, such as a “requirement” five times;
and referenced “time limits,” “time frame” and “time lines” seven
times.228
Construing the time limit in Proposition 66 as mandatory would not
defeat its primary purpose as it did in Garrison, where prioritizing judi-
cial speed over an accurate determination of election results would defeat
the statute’s purpose.229 A mandatory interpretation of the five-year time
limit would achieve the opposite outcome of what it would have in Gar-
rison—a mandatory interpretation of Proposition 66 would maintain its
purpose of shortening the time frame for capital appellate review.230 By
construing the five-year deadline as mandatory, the purpose of the initia-
tive is promoted, rather than defeated.
In addition to Garrison, the court cited several more cases, all of
which are equally distinguishable due to the explicit mandatory intent of
Proposition 66’s five-year time limit.231 In People v. Engram, the court
held that a statute required a directive interpretation because the text of
the statute stated that it must be applied “in accordance with the policy of
expediting criminal cases ‘to the greatest degree that is consistent with
the ends of justice.’”232 Thus, because the statute was explicitly condi-
tioned on “justice,” the court held that the statute was not a strict rule and
that a mandatory interpretation would effectively contradict the statute’s
stated intent.233
In Thurmond v. Superior Court, the court provided a directive inter-
pretation of a statute that ordered a stay of proceedings when a party or
attorney is a member of the legislature.234 The court held that a
mandatory reading of the statute could have serious injurious results, es-
pecially in a guardian ad litem case.235 The court found that because the
legislature did not intend these injurious effects or outcomes, the statute
required a directive interpretation.236 Here, a directive interpretation al-
lowed the court to consider whether “the attorney who is a member of
227 Id. § 3(d) at 213 (emphasis added).
228 Analysis by the Legislative Analyst, in VOTER GUIDE, supra note 10, at 104, 104.
229 Garrison, 32 Cal. 2d at 436-37.
230 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 881 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting); Garrison, 32 Cal. 2d at 436-37.
231 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 857-58.
232 People v. Engram, 50 Cal. 4th 1131, 1151 (2010) (emphasis omitted).
233 Id.
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the Legislature was employed for no other purpose than attempted de-
lay,” which furthered the statute’s legislative purpose.237
Similarly, in Lorraine v. McComb, the court provided a directive
interpretation of a statute that required a court to grant a trial continuance
“for a period not to exceed thirty days” when all parties agree in writing
to the continuance.238 The court ruled that the legislature did not intend
for the conveniences of the parties to override judicial control if such a
continuance is impracticable for the court to accommodate, especially
where the only harm to the parties is a delayed trial date.239
In each case cited by the court, a directive interpretation of the laws
advanced and protected the legislative purpose, which was determined by
evaluating the statute in the context of its real application and the possi-
ble consequences or outcomes that could result from its strict adher-
ence.240 Unlike in Garrison, Engram, Thurmond, Lorraine, and Verio
where the courts considered the language of the regulations in ascertain-
ing the statutory objective, the Briggs court failed to make the same nec-
essary and thoughtful determination of Proposition 66’s legislative
intent.241 Although the Briggs court asserted that Verio Healthcare, Inc.
v. Superior Court supports construing mandatory language as directory,
even when the statute does not include conditional language, as it did in
Thurmond,242 the decision in Verio conflicts with the Briggs ruling.243 In
contrast to Briggs, the Verio court struck down and invalidated the por-
tion of the revised law that included unconstitutional mandatory lan-
guage that was incapable of a reasonable directive interpretation.244 In
reaching its determination, the Briggs court appeared to disregard the
language of the provision entirely and failed to evaluate the initiative in
237 Id. at 840.
238 Lorraine v. McComb, 220 Cal. 753, 754, 757 (1934).
239 Id. at 755-57.
240 See Garrison, 32 Cal. 2d at 436-37; Engram, 50 Cal. 4th at 1151; Thurmond, 66 Cal. 2d at
839; Lorraine, 220 Cal. at 756-57; Verio, 3 Cal. App. 5th at 1329-30; Shafter-Wasco, 55 Cal. App.
2d at 485-89 (At issue in the case was an act that “provide[d] for the dissolution of irrigation dis-
tricts” by establishing that an appeal of such matter “shall be speedily tried” and “must be heard and
determined within three months.” The court ruled that the legislature did not intend to divest the
court of jurisdiction because a corresponding constitutional provision provided that the court shall
have 90 days to determine an appeal and “[the legislature] will not be presumed to have inconsistent
provisions as to the same subject in the immediate context.”).
241 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 855-61.
242 Id. at 854 (citing Verio, 3 Cal. App. 5th at 1329; Thurmond, 66 Cal. 2d at 839).
243 See Verio, 3 Cal. App. 5th at 1329-30.
244 Id. at 1329-30.
33
Nathaniel: California’s Capital Crisis Continues
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2019
202 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
the context of its real application and the consequences of such an
application.245
The Garrison court recognized that a determination of legislative
intent requires the judiciary to consider “the statute as a whole,” “the
nature and character of the act to be done,” and “the consequences which
would follow the doing or not doing of the act at the required time.”246
Accounting for all of these factors, Proposition 66 was intended to con-
trol the court’s timeliness in adjudicating death-penalty appeals and
habeas corpus petitions. Unlike the above cases, if the five-year time
limit was given literal and mandatory effect, Proposition 66’s purpose of
“shorten[ing] the time that the legal challenges to death sentences take”
would not be thwarted, but supported.247
It remains evident that the court’s rewriting of the five-year time
limit as merely directive was inappropriate and inconsistent with the
long-established rules of statutory interpretation. The court failed to pro-
duce a single case that supports a directive interpretation of a voter initia-
tive where the initiative at issue (1) explicitly establishes a consequence
for failure to do the act in the required timeframe, (2) includes express
mandatory language, and (3) is reasonably understood to have a legisla-
tive intent to control or impair the court’s core functions in violation of
the separation of powers doctrine, as determined through the basic rules
of statutory interpretation.
In each case cited by the court that applied a directive interpretation
to a statute with mandatory language, a directive interpretation was ap-
propriate because it furthered the statute’s primary goal and adherence to
the mandatory language would have effectively defeated that purpose.248
It is within a court’s authority to interpret legislation in a manner that
avoids constitutional issues or a separation of powers violation, but only
when the properly construed legislative purpose is furthered by a saving
construction.249 In other words, a saving construction “saves” a statute
from being struck down as unconstitutional if the statute can be reasona-
bly understood as requiring a directive effect to promote the statute’s
245 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 854 (supplying a directive interpretation despite the fact that the
“statute [was] framed in mandatory terms, and the voters were told in the ballot materials that the
five-year limit on the posttrial review process would be binding and enforceable”).
246 Garrison, 32 Cal. 2d at 437.
247 Analysis by the Legislative Analyst, in VOTER GUIDE, supra note 10, at 104, 105.
248 See Garrison, 32 Cal. 2d at 436; Engram, 50 Cal. 4th at 1151; Thurmond, 66 Cal. 2d at
839; Shafter-Wasco, 55 Cal. App. 2d at 488; Lorraine, 220 Cal. at 756-57; Verio, 3 Cal. App. 5th at
1329-30.
249 See People v. McGee, 19 Cal. 3d 948, 958 (1977) (“[I]n evaluating whether a provision is
to be accorded mandatory or directory effect, courts look to the purpose of the procedural require-
ment to determine whether invalidation is necessary to promote the statutory design.”); see also
Garrison, 32 Cal. 2d at 437.
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primary objective. The cited cases allowed for a saving construction not
merely because a directive interpretation avoided constitutional
problems, but because a directive interpretation was necessary to support
the challenged regulation’s underlying purpose and objective.
Briggs provides the polarity: instead of finding that the regulation
required a directive interpretation to support and maintain its underlying
statutory intent, the court disregarded the initiative’s intent and applied a
directive interpretation that undermines the express purpose of the statu-
tory reforms solely to avoid constitutional violations.250 Despite its asser-
tion that established separation of powers precedent required a saving
construction of the five-year time limit, none of the cited cases went as
far as to apply a directive interpretation where the statutory language
clearly expressed a contrary legislative intent. These cases are markedly
dissimilar, and neither compel nor authorize the court to impose a saving
construction on every statute, regardless of the legislative intent, simply
to uphold its constitutionality. Such an approach would venture outside
the scope of the judiciary’s power.
V. CONCLUSION
The Briggs court had a duty to strike down Proposition 66’s five-
year time limit in its entirety because it was intended by the voters to
place a mandatory time requirement on the court, in violation of the sep-
aration of powers doctrine. The court refused to give the time limit the
appropriate, mandatory effect it required as evidenced by the initiative’s
purpose and the voters’ intent. Instead, the court improperly supplied a
directive interpretation that concededly and expressly contradicts the will
of the voters. The mandatory intent of the time limit is clearly indicated
from the text of the proposed law and the language of the ballot materi-
als. Moreover, it was undisputed by the parties and the court that the
initiative “required” the courts to meet the five-year time limit; it was
undisputed that the initiative provided for a method of enforcement if
such a time frame was not met by the courts; it was undisputed that the
voters intended for the time limit to be mandatory;251 and it was ac-
knowledged by the court that judicial time limits imposed by legislation
250 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 857-58 (“[T]he voters intended the five-year limit to be mandatory.
We do not dispute that point.” However, “we too decline to infer that lawmakers intended strict
adherence to a fixed deadline that would undermine the courts’ authority as a separate branch of
government.”).
251 Id. at 855; Intervenor’s Brief in Reply to Amicus Curiae Briefs, supra note 74, at 36;
Respondents’ Preliminary Opposition to Amended Petition, supra note 74, at 12.
35
Nathaniel: California’s Capital Crisis Continues
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2019
204 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
are a prototypical example of a separation of powers violation.252 Dis-
missing these facts, the court erred when it failed to interpret the initia-
tive in a manner that conformed with the voters’ intent.
California’s appellate system is inundated with a large number of
death-penalty cases,253 and the Briggs ruling only adds to that effect. By
upholding the time limit under a directive interpretation, the court left
unworkable death penalty procedural reforms in its wake that encourage
arbitrary and inconsistent rulings which are likely to result in further de-
lays and a higher volume of capital appeals. First, Proposition 66 fails to
address the real problems that cause delays in California’s death-penalty
system, obstructing any realistic opportunity for reform. Second, the
Briggs court’s ruling that the five-year time limit is merely directive
threatens to incur more delays and more inconsistency due to the lack of
guidance and the inevitable issues its application will raise.
The reality of California’s death-penalty system demands judicial
sensitivity and caution because the state’s capital system has been exclu-
sively established through voter initiatives that cannot be “vetoed by the
Governor or amended or repealed by the Legislature”—consequently,
placing a heavy yet distinct burden on the judiciary.254 California courts
must now assume the “increasingly important role [of] construing the
reach of the California initiative process” and determine whether the cap-
ital-punishment system created by voter initiative infringes on fundamen-
tal constitutional policies and protections.255 For the judiciary to
effectively assume this role, it is imperative for courts to determine an
initiative’s validity by plainly interpreting and applying its language “so
as to effectuate the electorate’s intent.”256 Regrettably, the Briggs court
failed to fulfill this duty because a directive interpretation of the five-
year time limit does not effectuate the voters’ intent. However, this Com-
ment urges California courts to refrain from using the Briggs approach
and instead to exercise the utmost caution when undergoing judicial in-
terpretation and construction of a voter-initiated statute or provision. This
is especially important when the initiative at issue involves changes to
the capital-punishment process where what is at stake is literally a matter
of life or death. When faced with a constitutional challenge to a voter-
initiated judicial time limit for capital cases, a court must strike it down
as an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine
252 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 849, 852, 858 (“Deciding cases and managing dockets are quintes-
sentially core judicial functions. . . . and may not be materially impaired by statute.”).
253 Shatz, supra note 117, at 122.
254 Alarcón et al., supra note 8, at 160.
255 Id. at 160-61.
256 Id. at 161 (quoting Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 24 Cal. 4th 537, 576
(2000) (George, J., dissenting)).
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where it is clearly indicated that (1) the voters intended to place a
mandatory time limit on the judiciary and (2) the statutory purpose of the
time limit is not promoted by a saving construction or directive
interpretation.
The Briggs court continuously reiterated that although this is its in-
terpretation now, individuals may challenge these new laws based on
their impact and application on a particularized, individualized level.257
Thus, opportunities to remedy the problems with this initiative remain
available to those who will inevitably and undoubtedly wish to seek re-
dress. In the meantime, courts, capital defendants, and counsel will be
forced to endure the consequences of Proposition 66.
257 Briggs, 3 Cal. 5th at 827, 841, 845, 848, 859.
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